A St. Louis Police Department sergeant, Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, brought suit alleging that the police department violated Title VII by transferring her to another position due to her gender. Between 2008 and 2017, Muldrow had worked as a plainclothes officer in the department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the new division commander initiated a transfer of Muldrow out of the unit against her wishes, so that she could be replaced with a male officer. The outgoing commander communicated with the new commander that Muldrow was an exemplary sergeant. The new commander testified that he deemed Muldrow’s male replacement to be a “better fit for the division’s very dangerous work.” Additionally, the new commander repeatedly referred to Muldrow as “Mrs.” rather than “sergeant.”

Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same, but her perks, responsibilities and schedule changed. After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking officials on specialized Intelligence Division priorities and instead supervised the day-to-day activities of patrol officers. Muldrow also had her FBI status and access to an unmarked take-home vehicle revoked and her schedule became less regular and included weekend shifts.

The District Court granted the City summary judgment, which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit because Muldrow failed to show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage” (30 F.4th 680, 688). Because the transfer had caused “only minor changes in working conditions” and not “a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits,” Muldrow’s suit could not proceed.

The Supreme Court overruled the Eighth Circuit, holding that the harm required for a challenged transfer under Title VII need not be significant. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such an individual’s sex” (42 USC § 2000e-2[a][1]). The statutory language therefore merely required that Muldrow prove some disadvantageous change to an identifiable employment term or condition as a result of the transfer. The statute does not require that the harm be economic or tangible.

The transferee does not have to show that the harm was significant or exceeded some heightened bar as “discriminate against” means simply to be treated worse on some basis. Nowhere in the statute is there a demand for significant harm, as was required by the Eighth Circuit.

The City presented three arguments to justify a heightened significance standard: statutory text, precedent and policy. The court held that none of these arguments justified the use of such a bar. The court rejects the statutory text argument because any harm resulting from a discriminatory employment action is united on that basis, making all effects equal regardless of significance. Additionally, past Supreme Court decisions have only imbued a significant harm standard on retaliatory employer actions serious enough to dissuade an employee from pursuing a discrimination charge. Lastly, the court found it unpersuasive that employees would flood the courts with litigation without a significant harm standard because courts have multiple ways to dispose of meritless claims. Regardless, the Supreme Court refused to add words to the statutory language to “achieve what the City would deem a desirable result.”

This decision provides police officers additional legal basis to challenge an involuntary transfer, even without a direct loss in pay. The Peace Officers Procedural Bill of Rights and the Firefighters Bill of Rights guarantee California public safety employees the due process right to appeal any transfer for the purpose of discipline or resulting in the loss of pay. However, these statutes provide limited protections for non-disciplinary transfers from desirable or career-enhancing assignments that are not associated with special assignment pay.

As a result of this decision, an employee who is forcefully transferred to a new role because of sex, gender, race or some other protected basis may challenge the transfer under Title VII even if there is not a direct loss in pay, so long as there was some harm to his or her employment conditions. The employee need not prove that the transfer caused a significant, serious or substantial adverse effect, only that there was an adverse effect at all. This decision has since been cited by the Ninth Circuit and the Second District Court of Appeal of California.